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ETHICS AND ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years the concept of ontological security has become increasingly seductive 
to International Relations scholars, particularly those interested in placing questions of 
identity at the heart of security debates. This is because ontological security points 
towards psychological, rather than material, dynamics as underpinning social 
behaviours as actors seek a means of ‘going on’ in everyday life (Giddens 1991: 35). 
Indeed, the concept itself was initially coined by R. D. Laing (1969: 39), a psychologist, 
to describe how individuals seek to uphold a ‘presence in the world as a real, alive, 
whole, and in a temporal sense, a continuous person’. Ontological security therefore 
emphasises a concern with the continuity of the self, and more particularly is connected 
to the sense of confidence the self has in its own continuity. As Kinnvall (2004: 746) 
defines it, it ‘is a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is 
what it appears to be’.  
 
This suggests ontological security is underpinned by a radically different conception of 
security to that upheld within more mainstream International Relations, as well as in 
most policy making circles. Instead of an emphasis on maximizing wealth and power 
and countering/minimising physical threats to survival, ontological security’s emphasis 
on the importance of affirming our understanding of the world, it is argued, means that 
its pursuit may even entail imperiling those values. To this extent, ontological security 
has at times been defined in opposition to physical security (Lupovici 2012). However, 
while there are good heuristic reasons for doing this, there are also good grounds for 
suggesting that physical security concerns are actually embodied manifestations of (and 
therefore subsumed within) the particular ways in which state identities have been 
secured, stabilized and taken for granted over time (Mitzen: 2015). In other words, there 
is nothing natural or self-evident about the prioritization of physical security in 
International Relations, and indeed, such prioritization arguably does little to account 
for either the emergence or resolution of many physical security issues. 
 
At the same time, the chapter also indicates that ontological security offers something 
beyond the broader range of critical approaches to security. For instance, while human 
security and emancipatory approaches tend to focus on largely material issues of 
individual well being, they have had very little to say about the psychological dynamics 
of security seeking. Meanwhile, while post-structuralist approaches have focused on 
the securitization of enemy others in constituting self-identity (e.g. Campbell 1998) and 
have advanced an ethic of other-regarding behaviour, a focus on ontological security, 
not only provides clues as to why the securitization of otherness continues to hold 
attraction, but suggests the embracing of an other-regarding ethic is itself dependent on 
how subjects generate a sense of ontological security.  
 
Bearing all this in mind, at first glance ontological security appears an inherently 
positive condition and something that should be pursued and bolstered whenever 
possible, since its absence – ontological insecurity – suggests a condition of not feeling 
real, alive, whole, present or continuous. Indeed, a condition of ontological insecurity 
is usually described as one bedeviled by existential anxieties and feelings of dread, and 
where actors are liable to slip into melancholic or even psychotic states (Giddens 1991: 
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41). Ethically, the pursuit of ontological security would therefore appear 
unproblematic. Despite accepting this general sentiment this chapter argues that while 
the pursuit of ontological security is central to the human condition – and is something 
engaged in by individuals and collective actors – the strategies through which it is often 
pursued raise ethical questions and can sometimes be ethically objectionable insofar as 
they may legitimise prejudice, radical othering, conflict and violence – which is not to 
say there are never good ethical justifications for conflict and the use of violence, 
although justifying this is beyond the scope of the chapter. 
 
In particular, the chapter argues that ethical judgments of particular ontological security 
seeking practices will depend on the nature of subjectivity they individually support. In 
particular, it is argued that the requirements of ontological security are often equated in 
practice (but also in some academic analysis) with the need for certitude and enforcing 
closure around specific conceptions of self-identity. In contrast, the chapter resists the 
temptation to conflate ontological security with potentially categorical attachments to 
particular (yet ultimately contingent) identities. It argues instead that ontological 
security seeking strategies are most ethically defensible when they prioritise an 
emphasis on self-reflexivity and openness to plurality as part of a broader quest for 
fulfillment through living what, in Heidegger’s terms, might be called a more 
‘authentic’ life. 
 
The chapter begins by expanding on the concept of ontological security, before noting 
a number of its potentially ethically progressive attributes and possibilities. It then turns 
to what elsewhere has been referred to as its ‘dark side’ (Steele 2013), with particular 
emphasis placed on how the search for ontological security often results in the 
securitisation of subjectivity based on drawing lines of categorical difference with 
others. This temptation is then challenged by noting that there is no a priori reason to 
think that difference need be radicalised in order to enhance ontological security. The 
final section then sets about making the case for refocusing debates about ontological 
security away from upholding specific identities towards alternative ways of living with 
anxiety, and potentially even embracing anxiety as a starting point for living a more 
authentic and morally fulfilling life. 
 
Ontological (In)security: Anxiety and Fear 
 
One way of teasing out the contribution a focus on ontological security can make is to 
note that over the years IR scholars have become too unquestioning in their acceptance 
of Hobbes’ depiction of the human condition as at root characterised by a 
predominating fear of physical injury and death. Seen from an ontological security 
perspective, and an argument notably shared by Heidegger amongst others (see 
Berenskoetter 2010a), the human condition is rather one impregnated with anxiety, with 
fear being either secondary or derivative, as well as often a mechanism by which to 
escape it (see below). While anxiety can have different causes, Tillich (2000: 37) argues 
all anxieties always come down to anxiety about non-being. The ultimate anxiety, of 
course, relates to death and its unknown and unknowable aftermath, but Tillich (2000: 
38-51) argues existential anxieties are also evident whenever we are overwhelmed by 
a sense of meaninglessness or may emerge when we feel guilty or condemned for our 
moral failings (also Rumelili 2015). Anxiety therefore results when our systems of 
meaning and sense of self-integrity have been challenged or destabilised (Giddens 
1991: 44-5).  
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Given the precarious nature of existence and the innumerable threats that potentially 
face us anxiety could easily become overwhelming and paralysing. Debates about 
ontological security therefore concern the subject’s ability to ‘go on’ with everyday life 
by developing mechanisms that protect the subject from these otherwise potentially 
debilitating anxieties. In particular, the focus of analysis has been on how subjects seek 
to create a sense of certainty and predictability, to make order out of chaos, and in doing 
so to bracket out anxiety. While there is no single unified perspective on ontological 
security analysts broadly agree that a subject’s sense of ontological security is likely to 
be enhanced by three factors. 
 
The first of these concerns the subject’s sense of what Giddens (1991: 38-9) terms 
‘basic trust’, and which rests on the subject’s emotional and cognitive confidence in the 
nature of the world and ‘the existential anchorings of reality’. Giddens argues that for 
individuals the development of basic trust is largely dependent upon the extent to which 
the infant’s relations with key caretakers generates a sense of ‘confidence in the 
reliability of persons’. Insofar as it does, then Giddens (1991: 39) argues this provides 
‘a sort of emotional inoculation against existential anxieties – a protection against 
future threats and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in 
the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront’ (original 
emphasis). 
 
Second, the ability to cope with anxiety is also aided through the development of 
disciplining habits and routines which can provide ‘a “formed framework” for 
existence… [thereby]… cultivating a sense of “being”’ (Giddens 1991: 39). Routines, 
however, not only help instill a sense of order on everyday activity through their 
repetition, but also – because of their carrying over something from the past to the 
present and into the future – ‘hold the promise to exist indefinitely’, thereby fostering 
a sense of transcending time and offering the ‘illusion of immortality’ (Berenskoetter 
2010a), a point particularly pertinent in respect of collective routines practiced around 
religion and nationhood (see below).  
 
Third, and most significantly for our purposes, the melioration of ontological anxieties 
is also dependent upon the production, performance and reinforcement (including 
routinisation) of biographical narratives of self-identity that provide an account of 
ourselves and our actions in relation to others and unfolding events. Narratives of self-
identity are important because they are central to developing ‘a consistent [and 
emotionally comforting] feeling of biographical continuity’ from birth through to death, 
and help the self ‘answer questions about doing, acting and being’ (Kinnvall 2004: 
746). As we will see below, the search for a single stable identity often comes to 
dominate the quest for ontological security, often with problematic implications and 
effects. However, while the desire for a unified identity is understandable, this does not 
mean such stable identities exist (Kinnvall 2004: 747-8). In this respect, the Lacanian 
invocation to distinguish subjectivity from identity is instructive when thinking about 
ontological security seeking practices (Glynos and Howarth 2008: 162). From a 
Lacanian perspective the idea of a unified self with a coherent single identity is itself 
‘an imaginary construct that the individual needs to believe in to compensate for a 
constitutive lack that lies at the core of her (or his) identity’ (Epstein 2010: 334). 
However, while subjects may lack essentialised identities they still engage in practices 
of identification as part of an (inevitably doomed) attempt to capture and express their 
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authentic fullness. This is an ongoing process as ‘dislocatory events’ inevitably 
challenge established identifications and raise questions about how the subject is to ‘go 
on’, with such events compelling subjects ‘to identify with new objects and discourses 
to fill the lack made visible’ (original emphasis) (Glynos and Howarth 2008: 162-3; 
Epstein 2010: 334; Edkins 2003: 366).  
 
This last point is important as it reaffirms something often overlooked in debates about 
ontological security, which is that ontological security is not simply a question of 
asserting stability and reinforcing a sense of certitude about existence, the nature of the 
social world and self-identity, but also requires adaptability and a developed ability to 
cope with change (Craib 1998: 72). As such, Giddens (1991: 40-1) argues, a capacity 
for self-reflexivity is required to enable the subject to respond creatively and 
innovatively to a changing world. Indeed, from this perspective, for a subject with a 
well-developed sense of basic trust, anxiety may even be welcomed as an opportunity 
for dynamism and renewal (Steele 2008: 61; Mitzen 2006: 350). In contrast, ‘a blind 
commitment to established routines… is a sign of neurotic compulsion’, likely resulting 
from the lack of a healthy sense of basic trust (Giddens 1991: 40).  
 
A Positive Value: Community, Collectivity, Shaming 
 
It is evident, therefore, that fostering a sense of ontological security is a fundamental 
requirement if subjects are to avoid being paralysed by debilitating feelings of 
existential anxiety or to avoid ‘chronic melancholic or schizophrenic tendencies’ 
(Giddens 1991: 41). As such ontological security appears to be unquestionably good 
and something to be developed and protected. Moreover, as IR scholars have 
increasingly recognised, the requirements of ontological security are also important for 
developing a fuller understanding of international politics. Given the particular 
concerns of this volume the following analysis focuses on a number of ethical issues 
pertinent to debates about ontological security within IR. While the value and necessity 
of ontological security per se is not put into question, the following discussion focuses 
on the ethical and moral implications of how it is pursued, as most notably evident in 
international politics, and where it is argued a mixed picture emerges. The next section 
highlights the so-called ‘dark side’ of ontological security seeking. In contrast, we begin 
with a discussion of its more ethically positive elements. 
 
A good place to start is to recognise that the ontological security needs of individuals 
can be considerably enhanced through identifying the self with a broader collective and 
which in turn can provide motivation for community building.  As Marlow (2002: 247) 
and Krolikowski (2008) have noted, states are particularly notable in this respect, and 
which, aside from providing for the welfare and physical security of their citizens, are 
also important in contributing to their ontological security. Insofar as collective actors 
– and states more specifically – do this, then a normative judgment might be made that 
they should be valued for their ability to contribute to what Roe (2008: 785-87; Steele 
2013) has termed the ‘positive security’ of individuals. 
 
The point here is that the nation-state offers a mechanism via which individuals can 
anchor their identities historically. As Kinnvall (2004: 742-44) has noted, nationalism 
(but also religion) can help individuals establish a sense of continuity, stability and 
safety, even when other aspects of their personal life may be in disarray. Indeed, 
citizens frequently expect their political leaders to provide a coherent narrative of the 
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society and its place in the world and to furnish the nation with a sense of mission and 
purpose (Marlow 2002: 247). In doing so, such discourses set out a narrative of the 
nature of the world, typically draw a ‘direct primordial relationship to a certain territory 
(a “home”) and/or to a certain god(s)’, and in doing so help enhance ontological security 
(Kinnvall 2004: 763).  
 
Importantly nationalism not only establishes a cognitive order and sense of stability, 
but fundamentally elicits passionate and emotional attachments that bind citizens to the 
national community in ways that can generate significant amounts of ‘we feeling’ 
(Solomon 2013: 131). In consequence, citizens often develop a vicarious relationship 
with their nation, enhancing their own sense of individual ontological security and self-
esteem, and salving their own anxieties, by living through the achievements and 
experiences of the broader group. Such a relationship of vicarious identity is also one 
that can offer the individual the prospect of immortality, of surpassing death, by 
contributing, at least in some small way, to something bigger and historically significant 
that will endure long after one’s own physical expiration date has been reached 
(Berenskoetter 2010a).  
 
Taking a very different tack, it has also been demonstrated that the need for ontological 
security can create vulnerabilities and opportunities that can be exploited for more 
ethically progressive purposes. Of concern here is the fact that ontological security is 
fundamentally tied to insubjectivity and recognition dynamics – as evident in the extent 
to which the development of ‘basic trust’ in early childhood is fatefully linked to ‘the 
appraisals of others [the infant’s key caretakers]’ (Giddens 1991: 38). Subsequent 
claims to self-identity, therefore, need to be continually articulated and performed, but 
are inherently vulnerable to their reception and judgment by others. Actors failing to 
secure recognition for their identity claims from others are liable to feel angered, 
shamed and inadequate. It is therefore possible to actively undermine the ontological 
security of others through denying them the recognition they crave, or by making this 
conditional on undertaking particular actions (Delehanty and Steele 2009: 526).1 For 
example, Steele (2005) has shown how supporters of the Emancipation Proclamation 
successfully sought to shame the British into supporting the North during the American 
Civil War by emphasising how support for the South constituted a shameful embracing 
of slavery by a nation now defining itself in more progressive terms. 
 
In a similar vein, Zarakol (2011) has shown how, stigmatised for their lack of 
civilisation, Russia, Turkey and Japan spent much of the twentieth century emulating 
Western norms in order to enhance their status and standing and gain acceptance as full 
and equal members of international society. As she notes, however, in doing so each 
essentially accepted the Western hierarchical worldview and internalised the West’s 
judgments about their inferiority, with this in turn exacerbating the sense of shame and 
ontological insecurity (Zarakol 2011: 39, 95-6). On the one hand, this highlights how 
stigmatization/shaming dynamics can become self-reinforcing, and may generate 
bitterness at the constant reproduction of hierarchies in which assignations and 
identities of backwardness are perpetuated. On the other hand, and leading us into the 
next section, it also indicates that it may be ‘that only relationships of equal recognition 
can be stable in the long run’ (Zarakol 2011: 83). 
                                                        
1 Indeed, Delehanty and Steele (2009) are keen to point out that this shaming option is not only 
available to external others, but can also be utilised by marginalised or disaffected groups within the 
community. 
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The Dark Side of Ontological Security 
 
As we have seen, central to developing a sense of ontological security is the 
establishment of a sense of certainty and stability about the nature of the world, but also 
about the nature of the self. Insofar as this develops anxiety is reduced as social life 
unfolds along largely predictable and anticipated lines. Achieving this requires the 
adoption of routines and the articulation of biographical narratives of self-identity that 
position the self in relation to the world, but also in relation to others. However, the 
desire for certainty and predictability in order to ward off anxiety can go too far, taking 
on an idealized form that closes down alternatives, most notably via the conflation of 
the ontological security of the self with particular conceptions of self-identity.2 It is 
when this happens that the ‘dark side’ (Steele 2013) of ontological security seeking 
emerges, and where the quest for certainty can provide grounds for the politics of 
prejudice and justify violence and conflict against others in order to uphold sanctified 
conceptions of selfhood. 
 
The link between ontological security and conflict has been well established in the 
ontological security literature in IR. For example, both Mitzen (2006) and Rumelili 
(2015) have demonstrated how actors often appear more comfortable with the 
perpetuation of long running conflicts and security dilemmas with others, than with 
their resolution. Despite the manifest threat posed to their material and physical security 
in terms of unproductive resource expenditure, damage to infrastructure, loss of life, 
and despite the fact that in some cases their very physical survival may be at stake, both 
Rumelili and Mitzen argue such conflicts often endure because they uphold and 
reaffirm a sense of certainty about both self-identity and the identity of the other. By 
contrast, because conflict resolution and reconciliation require flexibility and an 
openness towards reconceptualising the identities of all parties – and as such also 
accepting that the world might not actually be how we think it is – it can also be anxiety-
inducing. Who, for example, will we be if our constitutive enemy turns out not to be 
categorically different or an enemy after all? Faced with such a prospect reconciliation 
may well be rejected in favour of the security of what is known. This observation, that 
actors often ‘pursue social actions to serve self-identity needs, even when these 
compromise their physical existence’ (Steele 2008: 2), is deeply significant because it 
fundamentally challenges the established axiom in IR that physical security is the 
primary value.  
 
Another example of how ontological security is often reduced down to attempts to 
reinforce particular conceptions of identity has been provided by Croft (2012), but this 
time looking at the constitutive role of the internal other in generating a sense of 
selfhood and certainty. Post-9/11, and perhaps even more so since the London 
bombings of July 7th 2005, debates about British identity, and the quest for a collective 
sense of ontological security, have increasingly been framed through the securitisation 
and othering of ‘the “jihadi” British Muslim’ presumed to be in our midst (Croft 2012: 
6). Securitising the internal other has thus become a means for redrawing the boundaries 
of inclusion/exclusion around Britishness and where a Muslim identity is increasingly 
viewed as suspect. In this sense, constituting the enemy has become a means of 
                                                        
2 On the relationship between self, identity and ontological security, see Browning and Joenniemi 
(2013b). 
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reaffirming a particular notion of British identity, while also providing grounds for 
(re)constituting a role and sense of mission in terms of combatting extremism and 
upholding ‘civilisation’. Of particular note, however, is that attempting to reaffirm a 
sense of ontological security through the radical othering of the ‘jihadi British Muslim’ 
has also had the effect of purchasing the ontological security of the majority at the 
expense of the ontological security of the minority, for whom anxieties have increased 
significantly. Thus, unlike other citizens, British Muslims – or even people suspected 
of having a Muslim background or sympathies –are publically expected to condemn 
violent actions perpetrated by other Muslims (in the UK or abroad) since, for many 
people, their loyalty to the state is deemed inherently suspect. Yet they do this despite 
knowing such declarations are never fully believed and will be expected to be repeated. 
 
The example is illuminating as it enables us to highlight a number of additional points 
about practices of ontological security seeking. First, the example takes us back to the 
relationship between anxiety and fear noted earlier and where it was suggested that fear 
often operates as a means of escaping (or sidestepping) anxiety. As Giddens (1991: 43) 
notes, what marks out anxiety from fear is that while fear emerges in ‘response to a 
specific threat and therefore has a definite object’ that can be prepared for or countered 
in some way, anxiety lacks such an object of focus as it emerges when one’s sense of 
integrity, systems of meaning or self-esteem are placed in question (Giddens 1991: 43-
5). As Rumelili (2015) puts it, anxiety is ‘experienced internally, rather than projected 
externally’. What the example demonstrates, however, is that actors suffering 
ontological anxieties – in this case about the stability of British identity, the strength of 
social cohesion, and the morality of Britain’s role in the world post-9/11, all generated 
in large part by the dislocatory events of 7th July perpetrated by a group of otherwise 
unremarkable ‘homegrown suicide bombers’ – are prone to deflect them through 
constituting objects of fear to physical security (‘the British jihadi Muslim’) that can be 
countered (through surveillance, stop and search powers, anti-terrorist hotlines, anti-
extremism and de-radicalisation programmes etc) and in doing so enabling systems of 
meaning about the nature of the world and identity to be re-established. As Steele 
(2008: 64) puts it, one way of dealing with anxieties about the unknown is therefore 
precisely to turn them into identifiable threats via securitisation processes, thereby 
‘turning anxiety into fear’ (original emphasis).3 
 
Second, the example also has bearing for the centrality of the idea of ‘home’ to 
generating ontological security. To quote Kinnvall (2004: 747) at length: 
 
The very category of “home” as a bearer of security can be found in its ability to 
link together a material environment with a deeply emotional set of meanings 
relating to permanence and continuity. Ontological security is maintained when 
home is able to provide a site of constancy in the social and material 
environment… Home, in other words, is a secure base on which identities are 
                                                        
3 Although it is worth noting that Croft (2012: 7-8) argues that some of the measures undertaken in the 
fight against terrorism have proven counterproductive in respect of anxiety reduction. This has been 
especially the case insofar as the constant emphasis on the everyday nature of the threat, the 
proliferation of surveillance systems, and the constant invocation for the population to be vigilant and 
take responsibility, has shifted the focus away from clear identifiable threats to more general 
amorphous risks. In a sense, the lack of specificity about the threat has generated epistemological 
anxieties that we might not know or always be able to identify exactly what or who threatens us. 
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constructed. Homelessness is exactly the opposite, as it is characterized by 
impermanence and discontinuity. 
 
Thus, when the security of ‘home’ is lost, when home no longer feels like home, or 
one’s belonging in the communal home is questioned, then people may begin looking 
for alternative homes in order to provide a sense of ontological security. Such a 
dynamic may help explain the apparent and otherwise perplexing (for mainstream 
Western society at least) attraction of groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) who actively reach out, offering a new home, to impressionable and otherwise 
disaffected Muslims in the West whose own belonging to their ‘home’ society is 
constantly questioned. 
 
Third, as Croft (2012: 73) notes, the example also demonstrates how ‘the securitization 
of identity leads to the securitization of subjectivity’, which in Kinnvall’s (2004: 749) 
terms refers to the ‘intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual 
existence)’ (original emphasis). Securitization’s freezing of identity is, in this way, felt 
to provide certainty and therefore reinforce ontological security. However, two 
principal ethical concerns result. First, since securitization entails identifying imminent 
existential threats to be countered it also typically plays into the radicalised enemy 
othering of those deemed threatening to self-identity. It therefore embeds conflict into 
the very fabric of identity construction. It suggests that if only the other could be fully 
expunged, the disordering chaos they represent expurgated, and the ‘ego skin’ sealed 
from contamination (Glass 1997), at last it would be possible to experience a pure state 
of self-being and ontological security. However, securitization does this by concealing, 
rather than illuminating, the inherent lack at the heart of subjectivity. Securitization, in 
other words, makes the ‘impossibility of security [appear] contingent [by suggesting 
that] [i]f only we can get rid of the current impediment, we can achieve a secure world’ 
(Edkins 2003: 367). 
 
Second, in these processes identity – and memory more particularly – can also become 
dangerously depoliticised as contending narratives of history and self-identity are 
closed down because of their perceived threat to the integrity of the self. Mälksoo 
(2015) has highlighted this point well in respect of the various memory conflicts taking 
place between states in Europe today – for instance, in respect of different nations’ roles 
in the Second World War or with regard to the Holocaust or experiences under the 
Soviet Union. In these conflicts, she notes, states are increasingly prone to adopting 
dogmatic positions, attempting to fix memories, be it through moral suasion or through 
introducing legislation prohibiting the articulation of contending accounts, because 
doing so is seen as necessary ‘to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of 
its political agency’ (Mälksoo 2015: 2). The effect of ‘framing historical remembrance 
as a security issue’, however, is that it has the effect of ‘ontologizing’ it, ‘transforming 
it into an inescapable condition of international politics’, which in turn is almost 
inevitably doomed to generate insecurity, and possibly even conflict. This is likely 
insofar as the contending historical narratives of others – and in particular their 
depiction of us – are ‘regarded as existentially endangering for our existence’, just as 
they perceive ours as endangering for them (Mälksoo 2015: 2). However, ontologizing 
‘a particular story, making it an unchanging part of the state’s self-definition’ (Mälksoo 
2015: 3), reduces ontological security to upholding a particular securitised identity. 
Such identity narratives and the historical memories upon which they are derived are 
never neutral, but operate in the interests and benefits of some to the detriment, 
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exclusion and marginalisation of others. It also, however, ‘seriously curbs the self-
reflexivity of the political subject’ (Mälksoo 2015: 5), which in turn will limit how that 
subject (i.e. the state) is able to understand and present itself in a changing world. 
 
Finally, there is a broader feminist point to be made about the role of nations and states 
in providing for the ontological security needs of their citizens. Notable about the above 
cases is that they all demonstrate how the pursuit of ontological security at the 
international level is often tied to the production and reproduction of conflict. When 
ontological security is sought in this way it therefore has the effect of further fostering 
a gendered reproduction of the international as a realm that privileges ‘masculine’ 
values and norms of conflict, strength and violence over a more ‘feminine’ ethic of care 
emphasising ‘mutual respect, peace and cooperation’ (Delehanty and Steele 2009: 535). 
Moreover, insofar as citizens generate a sense of ontological security through living 
vicariously through the achievements of the nation, then states also become implicated 
in the further reproduction of masculinised values at the individual level. As Haigh 
(draft) argues, one problematic manifestation relates to how nations seek to generate 
patriotism and loyalty through commemorative practices which typically eulogise the 
nation’s military exploits. In the context of the First World War centennial 
commemorations in the UK, for example, people have been encouraged to mine their 
family histories and connect with their ancestors’ experiences of the Great War, with 
arguably much less emphasis placed on exploring the politics of the conflict. As such, 
people today have been encouraged to draw pride and reflected glory – to live 
vicariously – through the actions and sacrifices of their forebears. This linking of 
personal family history to broader narratives of the nation is powerful, but is also deeply 
infused with militaristic values and sentiment. As Haigh puts it, in such practices there 
is ‘the possibility that the very idea of being itself may have become militarised’ (Haigh 
draft). 
 
Repositioning Difference 
 
As is evident, therefore, the quest for ontological security can incorporate ethically 
unsettling practices of securitising subjectivity, radical othering, the militarisation of 
being and the prolongation (and even generation) of conflict. The search for order and 
certainty, it seems, can all too easily spill over into violence and oppressive politics. 
The remainder of the chapter therefore makes two points. In the final section the 
centrality of order and identity to ontological security is loosened, with greater 
emphasis placed on the subject’s capacities for self-reflexivity and adaptability. First, 
however, it is important to affirm that the temptation to securitise subjectivity through 
the identification of radicalised otherness is not inevitable, even though this often 
happens in practice. 
 
At the crux of the issue is whether or not the identification of difference central to 
constituting ontologically safe identities requires identities be framed in exclusivist 
terms and be placed in an adversarial relationship? The very notion of friendship (at 
both the individual and inter-state levels) suggests alternative options are available for 
anchoring ontological security that may even (and often does) include an active 
appreciation of difference. As Norton (1988: 37) puts it, what binds friends is not 
simply what they have in common, but also what they do not. Indeed, such differences 
are often valued as providing space for interaction and an alternative perspective. 
Friendship, Berenskoetter (2010b) notes, ‘matters because it moulds and reinforces 
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“identity”, or the sense of Self’. Rather than being built on antagonism it is a positive 
form of difference premised on equality, respect and solidarity.  
 
Moreover, it is also important to recognise that it is possible to escape histories of 
conflict even in cases where the conflicts have themselves become deeply significant 
for the establishment of the respective parties’ senses of self-understanding and 
ontological security. One example is the emergence of the Nordic security community 
over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and where a mutually 
reproducing war community has been transformed into a region of peace in which the 
differences between the Scandinavian nations are no longer viewed in categorical terms 
as existentially threatening, but have come to bind them together, not least through the 
idea that there are different ways of being Scandinavian (Browning and Joenniemi 
2013a). The transformation of Western Europe following the end of the Second World 
War offers another similar example. 
 
Such examples, however, also suggest an imperative exists that scholars do not fall into 
the trap of overemphasising the importance to ontological security of upholding 
particular (exclusivist) conceptions of identity, or put differently, being misled by the 
practices of actors they observe in the field into confusing ontological security seeking 
strategies with ontological security per se. Insofar as they do, the danger is that they 
may end up providing a normative justification for the securitization of identity 
(Mälksoo 2015; Browning and Joenniemi 2013b), thereby confusing means with ends. 
As the cases of Norden and Europe demonstrate, (radical) identity adjustments and 
transformations are not a priori inimical to reducing existential anxieties and 
establishing ontological security, but may at times be precisely what is required. 
  
Conclusion: Living with Anxiety 
 
Extending this point is that attempting to achieve ontological security via the 
securitization of identity is itself symptomatic of, and premised on, the illusion that 
ontological security is an achievable end point, a position we can pin down and occupy. 
This is a misconception since ontological security is actually inherently elusive, beyond 
capture and instead best viewed as a constant work in progress – or part of what Giddens 
(1991: 5) refers to as the ongoing ‘reflexive project of the self’. As Edkins (2003: 366) 
notes, if the subject is understood in Lacanian terms as inherently incomplete, as has 
been argued for here, then ‘it is in its very character insecure’ (original emphasis). 
Rather than fleeing from anxiety in search of an elusive singularity of a ‘perfectly 
“securable” identity’, it would instead, as Mälksoo (2015: 6) argues, ‘be wiser to 
acknowledge and come to terms with it’. Indeed, for Steele (2008: 61) this is nothing 
short of a moral imperative since the problem with adherence to overly rigid routines 
is that they ‘not only prevent us from reforming our actions, they inhibit our humanity. 
They turn us from subjects to objects’. 
 
We can find support for this view in Heidegger, who actively calls for us to embrace 
the generative possibilities immanent within anxiety, and in doing so pushes beyond a 
narrower conception that reduces ontological security largely down to the ability to ‘go 
on’ and cope with everyday life without being paralysed by existential anxieties. Such 
a position is arguably evident in Giddens’ (1991: 35-7) rendering of ontological security 
when he places emphasis on the importance of subjects to develop a sense of ‘practical 
consciousness’. Practical consciousness emerges when identities and routines have 
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become habituated and taken for granted to such a degree that they enable one to act 
without having to consciously and continuously make decisions about elements of 
everyday activity. For Giddens, practical consciousness is the ‘natural attitude’ on the 
other side of which ‘chaos lurks’. 
 
For Heidegger, however, practical consciousness – or what he refers to as ‘everyday 
being’ (Inwood 2000: 27) – is necessary but insufficient in itself to live a fulfilling and 
meaningful life and in his terms lacks authenticity and resoluteness. Thus, while 
Giddens argues reflexivity lies at the heart of ontological security, enabling the subject 
to reflect on their biographies and routines and to assess their suitability to the situation 
and thereby consider whether they need adapting, for Heidegger self-reflection requires 
more. For him, it is not simply a question of suitability and cognitive ordering but 
requires asking fundamentally ethically inflected questions about the nature of the 
virtuous life and who the subject wants to be. Such questions actively invite anxiety in 
because they require self-interrogation as to whether one is on the right path, and to this 
extent indicate that while everyday routines may salve anxieties they can also 
compromise the self’s ability to embrace its full potential (Berenskoetter 2010a). To do 
this, however, also requires (and is arguably inspired by) accepting the imminence of 
the ultimate anxiety of death, and in the face of one’s own mortality resolving to make 
the most of the time one has by seizing the possibilities of being (Inwood 2000: 69-79; 
Browning and Joenniemi 2013b). Anxiety and death, therefore, become revalued as 
creative forces, or as Foley (2010: 210) has more recently and pithily expressed it: 
‘Mortality is the spice of life’. 
 
Seen from this perspective routines and biographical identity narratives are only one 
part to building ontological security, and where its other dimensions require self-
reflexivity and self-interrogation with respect to questions about the nature of the good 
life. Rethinking ontological security in terms of a quest for authenticity – a morally 
meaningful and fulfilling life – is also significant because it might offer alternative 
perspectives on key elements of international politics: such as why, despite growing 
affluence and despite the fundamental challenges science poses them, religion and 
nationalism appear increasingly resurgent; or why bored youth continue to find appeal 
in military adventures (Kustermans and Ringmar 2011). Finally, though, as 
Berenskoetter (2010a) has noted, embracing authenticity also needs to be tempered by 
recognition of the fact that political projects utilising the language of authenticity may 
themselves be far from progressive: the Nazi’s being one notable example. However, 
rather than undermining the invocation that the quest for a meaningful and morally 
fulfilling life should also be at the heart of discussions about ontological security, the 
ethical imperative that this demands is that calls to depoliticize such projects should be 
resisted, in favour of emphasising self-reflexivity and an openness towards otherness 
that resists securitising subjectivity around exclusivist categorisations of identity. 
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